General
In late 2025, a series of long-term investment decisions brought renewed attention to India’s data centre sector. Google and Microsoft announced new commitments, collectively amounting to over US$32 billion, signalling growing interest in India as a commercial and strategic hub for data infrastructure in Asia.
There is a temptation to frame these developments as indicators of an imminent AI revolution in India. That would be premature.
India’s market size and level of digital maturity – with enterprise cloud adoption, public digital platforms, and consumer-scale services – now justify local high-performance infrastructure. Processing data locally reduces time lags in data access, improves reliability, and supports compliance with data protection rules. India’s regulatory trajectory – while not without ambiguity – has also broadly favoured localisation.
The investments also point to a quieter geoeconomic recalibration. Global technology firms are increasingly reassessing the risks of concentration across production, supply chains, and digital infrastructure. India fits into this diversification logic by offering market scale, a deep technical workforce, and policy support for domestic infrastructure. While the “China+1” approach is often portrayed as a sharp pivot away from Beijing, it is an incremental strategy: companies are deliberately distributing their next-generation data and computing capacity across multiple jurisdictions to balance efficiency, regulatory risk, and operational resilience.
But this is not simply a geopolitical hedge; it is also a result of material improvements in India’s energy corridor, subsea cable connectivity, land availability for hyperscale campuses, and targeted state-government incentives. India has hosted data centres for over a decade, but the recent announcements reflect a marked shift in scale and integration. The focus is now on large, AI-ready facilities that position India as a hub capable of supporting core AI operations.
A gigawatt-class data-centre campus can consume as much electricity as a mid-sized city and most recently announced projects are in states where urban power demand is already under strain.
There is a temptation to frame these developments as indicators of an imminent AI revolution in India. That would be premature. Hyperscalers have been expanding since the late 2010s. The 2025 announcements are an extension of their ongoing build-out. Moreover, data centres are infrastructure enablers, not outcome-producing assets themselves. Economic benefits will accrue gradually through construction jobs, operations roles, increased demand for power and cooling systems, and the cloud systems and AI tools that rely on this infrastructure.
However, these investments do guarantee a foundation. As computing resources become cheaper and more available locally, sectors from healthcare and agriculture to finance and logistics will have fewer barriers to adopting AI-driven tools. Use in the public sector – from land record digitisation to welfare delivery – may also expand, though this requires adequate governance safeguards not yet fully developed.
The new scale of data infrastructure investments also brings challenges. A gigawatt-class data-centre campus can consume as much electricity as a mid-sized city and most recently announced projects are in states where urban power demand is already under strain. While Google and Microsoft have committed to sourcing renewable energy, in practice hyperscale facilities are expected to remain primarily dependent on state grids, especially during periods of peak demand or variable renewable output. Water use for cooling is another significant concern, particularly in regions already under environmental stress.
The uneven regional distribution of India’s data centre expansion also matters. Much of the recent surge in infrastructure expansion is concentrated in a few key corridors in southern and western India. This geographic clustering could expose India’s digital infrastructure to localised disruptions from extreme weather events or other regional contingencies that can affect connectivity or power availability.
Yet the harder challenge is in regulatory coherence. Bureaucratic processes such as environmental clearances, land conversion, and grid-connection agreements are typically handled by different authorities, often with limited coordination across states. India’s push for digital sovereignty can strengthen oversight, but localisation of infrastructure alone cannot achieve this. While Microsoft’s focus on “sovereign-ready” solutions as a core component in its recent investment announcement signals that global cloud providers are responding to India’s regulatory priorities, it will need to strengthen governance, interoperability standards, domestic innovation, and market regulation to make digital sovereignty a reality.
The lesson from 2025 is that India is neither an overnight global data centre hub nor a passive recipient of foreign capital. The decisions by companies like Google and Microsoft are part of a deeper realignment towards diversified, large-market, regulation-compatible infrastructure strategies. And India has earned its place in that calculus. The test now lies in whether it can turn this moment into a stable, long-term advantage rather than simply a favourable chapter in an uncertain global cycle.